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ABSTRACT
I discuss the lessons learned during the design and implementation of three knowl-
edge representations systems for sensemaking. The focus is on the tension that
exists between a knowledge representation's role as a surrogate for the world and
its role as a facilitator of computational reasoning. Each system accepts natural
language inputs and implements a bidirectional model of sensemaking. One system
emphasizes inference while the other two systems emphasize their role as a repre-
sentation for the world. I discuss the differences between these systems and what
gives rise to these differences.
Thesis Supervisor: Boris Katz
Title: Principal Research Scientist
1 Introduction
One of the primary goals of artificial intelligence research is the approximation of
human intelligence by computers. This often boils down to the development of com-
putational reasoning that allows a computer to "think" as humans do. A popular
example of such reasoning is exemplified in robotics research. That is, what sort of
reasoning must a robot perform to function in the real world as humans do? What
sort of reasoning is required to navigate the world and to interact with objects and
people?
The field of knowledge representation addresses issues that are faced when incor-
porating knowledge into a computer to support such reasoning. The problem of
knowledge representation is central to the field of artificial intelligence. All artificial
intelligence applications will depend on knowledge and thus they will depend on the
representation of that knowledge. In this thesis, I discuss the lessons learned during
the design and implementation of three knowledge representation systems for the
task of sensemaking.
Sensemaking is a very human activity. It is the process by which humans make sense
of things. At the risk of overgeneralizing, I would say that it is present in everything
that humans do. We must make sense of our environment to interact with it. This
includes anything from navigating inside it to interacting with the objects and peo-
ple that are encountered. Any application that can truly emulate human intelligence
must have within it the capacity to perform sensemaking, and any such application
must possess a knowledge representation that can support such sensemaking. Other
problems and issues are just as relevant to artificial intelligence. However, if there
is to be significant progress in artificial intelligence, such progress will include some
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work on the problem of knowledge representation and sensemaking. The goal of this
project is to work towards the development of such a representation. This represen-
tation would not only allow a computer to reason with human-like intelligence, but
it would also offer some valuable insights into human intelligence itself.
The field of knowledge representation has existed for over half a century, and its his-
tory has been a turbulent one; it still remains difficult to define it. There are many
ways to answer the fundamental question "What is knowledge representation?", and
this is a question I must address if the reader is to understand the work I have done,
and how it relates to other existing knowledge representation systems.
The same is true of sensemaking. While the concept of sensemaking may be intu-
itive, a clean definition remans elusive. I have remarked above that sensemaking is
the process by which humans make sense of things, but that alone does not explain
much. In order for the reader to understand how my knowledge representations are
particularly suited for sensemaking, I must first explain what sensemaking actually
is.
In the next two sections, I will provide the reader with relevant background infor-
mation on knowledge representations and sensemaking.
1.1 Knowledge Representation
A knowledge representation can be understood by the roles that it is intended to
play [1]. I focus on two.
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A knowledge representation is a surrogate for the world. This is its most fundamen-
tal role. It allows us and machines to think and reason about the world without
acting. For example, we have mental representations that allow us to predict the
consequences of our actions. We have representations that allow us to perform
arithmetic. These representations are abstractions of the world, and the same goes
for representations for artificial intelligence applications. Depending on the task at
hand, a knowledge representation will only describe certain aspects of the world.
This will be apparent when I compare different representations with each other.
When examining a representation's role as a surrogate, there are several things to
take note of. The first thing, of course, is what the representation intends to surro-
gate. The second question, and one I am particularly concerned with, is how readily
it represents it. That is, how difficult is it to use such a representation? Is it as
simple as writing several sentences, or does it require a certain level of expertise
before it can be useful? Is it readily usable by machines?
A knowledge representation also determines how a machine will "think" about the
world. I noted that a knowledge representation is required as support for compu-
tational reasoning. Ideally, a single representation should be able to support any
type of computational reasoning. Realistically, however, that is not the case. Dif-
ferent knowledge representations facilitate different types of reasoning. This alone
is enough to differentiate between most representations.
These roles of a knowledge representation, while distinct, are not independent. In
fact, the majority of my work has been focused on the interplay that exists between
them. Throughout the rest of this thesis, I will compare other knowledge representa-
tions against my own. It is the interplay between a knowledge representation's role
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as a surrogate and its role in reasoning that is of most interest. There is a tension
between these two roles that is difficult to escape. On the one hand, I may focus on
a representation's role as a surrogate and design it in such a way that allows me to
easily represent many things. This often comes at the cost of limiting the amount
of reasoning that can be performed with the representation. On the other hand, I
may focus on the reasoning itself instead, only to find that a robust and complex
reasoning system severely limits a representations role as a surrogate for the world
by making it too complex and difficult to use.
1.2 Sensemaking
Sensemaking is the process by which one makes sense of things. Common sense, for
example, is a type of sensemaking.
I will start at the highest level with Gary Klein's model of sensemaking. Klein
models sensemaking as a two-way process that fits data to a frame while simultane-
ously fitting a frame around the data [2]. This concept of bidirectional processing
is central to my work.
A frame, given particular inputs, is the context for those inputs. Given a small
number of seemingly unrelated and meaningless inputs, a frame is what links these
inputs together to give them meaning. You might consider a frame to be similar to
a story. A story can explain the connection between seemingly independent inputs.
For example, a story can explain the relationship between the presence of a dog and
a cat in an image; it can explain that the dog is chasing the cat. A frame performs
the same task. An interesting caveat is that different frames give rise to different
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meanings for the same experience. This is not a new idea. It is not common for
individuals to interpret the same data in different ways. This is because they used
different stories to place the data in different contexts-in the example above, the
dog might be following the cat. These different stories may arise from differences in
background knowledge, biases, and other sources.
For this project, the process of sensemaking is just as essential as the product of
sensemaking. The goal is not simply to correlate between input and output, but to
truly emulate the path that takes a human being from input to output. Differences
between input and output pairs can point to differences in sensemaking processes
that might help us better understand how machines and humans reason.
The modeled process is a bidirectional process, one direction being from data to
frame, and the other direction being from frame to data. Given minimal amounts
of input data, one might not have a definitive explanation or story to map onto
the data. Rather, what one might have is a whole slew of hypothesis explanations
and stories, any of which might explain the data. The inputs might be so sparse
that they are not sufficient to decide between the hypotheses. Still they might be
enough for one to restrict the set of possible stories to a manageable subset. That
is the bottom-up direction: lower-level inputs are used to gather together a set of
higher-level hypotheses about the inputs. However, now that one has hypothesis
stories in hand, one does have an idea of what sort of inputs would be required to
narrow down the list. This knowledge directs the top-down direction, in which one
forages for information that will allow one to narrow down the list of stories. This
is the sort of bidirectional processing that I have attempted to model.
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The idea of bidirectional reasoning is inspired by real life accounts of actual sense-
making. I will provide some examples here to lend credibility to my claim that this
sort of bidirectional is something that humans do to some degree.
Example 1: Unidentified Aircraft [2]
Major A.S. discussed an incident that occurred soon after 9/11 in which
he was able to determine the nature of overflight activity around nu-
clear power plants and weapons facilities. This incident occurred while
he was an analyst. He noticed that there had been increased reports in
counterintelligence outlets of overflight incidents around nuclear power
plants and weapons facilities. At that time, all nuclear power plants
and weapons facilities were "temporary restricted flight" zones. So this
meant there were suddenly a number of reports of small, low-flying planes
around these facilities. At face value, it appeared that this constituted a
terrorist threat-that "bad guys" had suddenly increased their surveil-
lance activities. There had not been any reports of this activity prior
to 9/11 (but there had been no temporary flight restrictions before 9/11
either).
Major A.S. obtained access to the Al Qaeda tactics manual, which in-
structed Al Qaeda members not to bring attention to themselves. This
piece of information helped him to begin to form the hypothesis that
these incidents were bogus. "It was a gut feeling, it just didn't sit right.
If I were a terrorist I wouldn't be doing this."
He recalled thinking to himself, "If I was trying to do surveillance how
would I do it?" From the Al Qaeda manual, he knew they wouldn't
break the rules, which to him meant that they wouldn't break any of the
flight rules. He asked himself, "If I'm a terrorist doing surveillance on
a potential target, how do I act?" He couldn't put together a sensible
story that had a terrorist doing anything as blatant as overflights in an
air traffic restricted area.
He thought about who might do that, and kept coming back to the over-
flights as being some sort of mistake or blunder. That suggested student
pilots to him because "basically, they are idiots."
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He was an experienced pilot. He knew that during training, it was abso-
lutely standard for pilots to be instructed that if they got lost, the first
thing they should look for were nuclear power plants. He told us that
''an entire generation of pilots" had been given this specific instruction
when learning to fly. Because they are so easily sighted, and are easily
recognized landmarks, nuclear power plants are very useful for getting
one's bearings. He also knew that during the pilot training the visual
flight rules would instruct students to fly east to west and low-about
1,500 feet. Students would thus fly low patterns, from east to west, from
airport to airport.
It took Major A.S. about three weeks to do his assessment. He found all
relevant air traffic messages by searching databases for about three days.
He picked three geographic areas with the highest number of reports and
focused on those. He developed overlays to show where airports were lo-
cated and the different flight routes between them. In all three cases, the
"temporary restricted flight" zones (and the nuclear power plants) hap-
pened to fall along a vector with an airport on either end. This added
support to his hypothesis that the overflights were student pilots, lost
and using the nuclear power plants to reorient, just as they had been
told to do.
He also checked to see if any of the pilots of the flights that had been cited
over nuclear plants or weapons facilities were interviewed by the FBI.
In the messages, he discovered that about 10% to 15% of these pilots
had been detained, but none had panned out as being "nefarious pilots".
With this information, Major A.S. settled on an answer to his question
about who would break the rules: student pilots. The students were
probably following visual flight rules, not any sort of flight plan. That
is, they were flying by looking out of the window and navigating.
Example 2: Tank in the Desert [2]
During a Marine Corps exercise, a reconnaissance team leader and his
team were positioned overlooking a vast area of desert. The fire team
leader, a young sergeant, viewed the desert terrain carefully and observed
an enemy tank move along a trail and then take cover. He sent this situ-
ation report to headquarters. However, a brigadier general, experienced
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in desert-mechanized operations, had arranged to go into the field as
an observer. He also spotted the enemy tank. But he knew that tanks
tend not to operate alone. Therefore, based on the position of that one
tank, he focused on likely overwatch positions and found another tank.
Based on the section's position and his understanding of the terrain,
he looked at likely positions for another section of tanks and found the
well-camouflaged second section. He repeated this process to locate the
remaining elements of a tank company that was well-camouflaged and
blocking a key choke point in the desert. The size and position of the
force suggested that there might be other high and supporting elements
in the area, and so he again looked at likely positions for command and
logistics elements. He soon spotted an otherwise superbly camouflaged
logistics command post. In short, the brigadier general was able to see
and understand and make more sense of the situation than the sergeant.
He had much more experience, and he was able to develop a fuller pic-
ture rather than record discrete events that he noticed.
Both of these stories are prime examples of how people use a two-way sensemaking
process to fit a story to data. The first story is my favorite example of sensemaking.
In that first example, the input is sparse and seemingly meaningless: there have
been increased reports of low-flying aircraft in restricted flight zones. That could
mean anything! In fact, it is exactly because it is not clear what the inputs mean
that Major A.S. was summoned in the first place.
There were some initial hypotheses, of course; namely that these low-flying aircraft
were piloted by terrorists. However, no one could be certain that this was the cor-
rect explanation, and no one wanted to jump to conclusions and claim that someone
was a terrorist without definitive proof. In order to confirm or deny the hypothe-
sis, Major A.S. had to forage for more information. The original hypothesis, that
these pilots were terrorists, suggested that he refer to the Al Qaeda training book
(a top-down direction). However, what he found in the manual, i.e., instructions to
all operatives to not attract attention, threw doubt upon the current hypothesis. It
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seemed clear to Major A.S. that he needed to come up with a new hypothesis. It
made more sense to suppose that the pilots were actually students. Still, this was
a simple hypothesis without any supporting evidence, so he needed to forage for in-
formation that would either prove or disprove it (a top-down direction). Ultimately,
he was able to dig up enough information to confidently claim that the pilots were
students, and that the only reason there were "more" was because people were more
likely to take note in the post-9/11 climate.
The second story is also of particular interest to this project. It exemplifies many of
the same sensemaking ideas that this project is focused on. Again, just as with the
first example, the input is very sparse. Initially, the only salient input is the single
tank. Alone, it does not mean much. However, the brigadier general, based on his
previous experience, was able to project a hypothesis story onto the data. He saw a
tank in the desert and expected to see another nearby. And indeed, after scanning
the area with the single goal of finding more tanks, he did find them. Finding a
company of tanks suggested that a command post might be nearby, so after search-
ing the area with the specific goal of finding one, he was able to find it, despite its
superb camouflage.
Both stories highlight some very important ideas. First, and most important, is that
one cannot make sense of inputs without somehow placing them into a context of
previously known world knowledge. This is a reason why knowledge representation
is so essential to any computational sensemaking. That single morsel of information
that unidentified aircraft were flying in restricted flight zones meant almost nothing
by itself. However, upon receiving this information, we immediately rush to give
meaning to it by supplementing it with additional information. For example, you
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have to wonder why aircraft were flying in restricted flight zones. We answer these
sorts of questions by coming up with an explanation or story to explain such data.
In fact, it was that bit of information in combination with the experiences from the
recent 9/11 attack that immediately led to hypotheses about terrorists. Nothing
has meaning unless it is put into context, even though that "meaning" might not
be the truth. This may be obvious, but it is important that it is stated here clearly.
The second point is that hypotheses and conclusions that result from the sensemak-
ing process can be quite varied, and depend quite heavily on the knowledge that
is available to the sensemaker. For example, without the Al Qaeda manual, it was
not too unreasonable for one to initially suspect that the student pilots flying near
the nuclear power plants and weapons facilities might be terrorists, especially given
the post 9/11 climate. However, given the information found in the Al Qaeda train-
ing manual, it would be obvious that the pilots were not terrorists since they were
clearly calling attention to themselves by flying in restricted flight zones. That, or
they were very bad terrorists. The same thing is even more obvious in the second
story. The sergeant saw a single tank and saw only that. He did not construct a story
explaining its presence there and simply reported it to headquarters. The brigadier
general, however, with many more years of experience at his disposal, knew that the
single tank was only the tip of the iceberg, and after carefully foraging in the area
for more clues, was able to uncover an entire platoon of tanks and a camouflaged
command center.
Finally, it is clear in both scenarios that sensemaking is a bidirectional process.
Lower level inputs influence higher level and more abstract processes while those
very same higher level processes directly influence the search for lower level inputs.
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Alerts about unidentified aircraft suggest certain hypotheses, and in particular, one
about potential terrorists scouting new targets. This is the bottom-up direction.
However, additional information upsets these hypotheses. In particular, informa-
tion from the Al Qaeda manual throws a shadow on any hypotheses that the pilots
were terrorists. As a consequence, previously undervalued hypotheses (perhaps so
undervalued that they were not even considered) that these pilots were simply lost
students gain more credence. So now, at a high level, there are new hypotheses
which drive the search for lower level inputs that would help confirm or deny this.
(It is interesting to note that the decision to search for validating versus invalidating
information can lead to biases that lead to different conclusions.) It is this top-down
guidance that drove Major A.S. to look towards air traffic messages for more infor-
mation. It is why he selected three geographic areas with many reports. It is why
he checked flight vectors, and why he checked for the presence of airports. It is
also why he checked to confirm that none of the detained pilots turned out to be
terrorists.
Similarly, the single tank in the second scenario suggested to the brigadier general
that there was probably more than a single tank present. Making use of his expe-
rience, a higher level and more abstract process directed a lower level foraging loop
to search for evidence of additional tanks and enemy units. In important detail is
that the command post was very well camouflaged. The brigadier general was only
able to find it because he was looking for it.
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1.3 Knowledge Representations for Sensemaking
This thesis discusses the lesson learned during the design and implementation of
knowledge representation systems for sensemaking. The lesson is about the ten-
sion that exists between a knowledge representation's role as a surrogate for the
world and its role as a facilitator of inference, and how difficult it is to escape that
tension when designing a knowledge representation. This tension is also apparent
in earlier knowledge representation systems as well, as I will show in the next section.
One can design knowledge representation for anything. I chose to designed knowl-
edge representations for sensemaking because I am interested in emulating human
reasoning. I wish to do this not only because I want to create a machine that can
think like a human, but also because I believe that if we can emulate human reason-
ing, we will better understand ourselves. Human intelligence, although very special,
is by no means perfect. We are subject to various limitations. For example, our
short-term memory capacity is rather limited, and we are unable to retrieve every-
thing from long-term memory efficiently. Our ability to process input information
is also quite limited. Our attention is foveated to deal with this; it is focused on
a subset of the inputs that are available to us, which is one explanation as to why
we might miss important details. These limitations, and others as well, may lead
to the formations of biases. For example, people exhibit confirmation bias when
they specifically seek out information that supports their current hypothesis while
ignoring everything else, and this might be a consequence of our naturally foveated
attention. People cannot attend to everything because their attention is limited,
so they may opt to attend to inputs that will validate their current hypotheses,
leaving them open to making mistakes. If we can successfully emulate human-like
sensemaking, then we will be able to better understand where and how people make
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mistakes when performing sensemaking. If we can do that, then it may be possible
to predict and prevent many of the errors that we tend to make.
I focus on sensemaking that take as input natural language. I do this for two rea-
sons. The first is that much of what happens during sensemaking can be described
in language. The second reason is that I have at my disposal a tool for processing
natural language: Boris Katz's START [8]. I will describe it in a later section.
I do not claim that language alone is enough for humanlike sensemaking. Much of
our sensemaking relies on other sources of information, such as the visual input.
Language is one of many layers. For example, the visual process is most likely just
as essential as language. Any system that wishes to truly emulate human intelli-
gence must be multi-modal, just as the human brain is. Unfortunately, while there
is a robust language system available for my use, no similarly robust machine vi-
sion system exists (to my knowledge), which is why I focus on the natural language
component of sensemaking for this project.
2 Background
This section is describes background work that is relevant to this thesis.
2.1 Previous Research
Before diving into my own research, I will describe three pre-existing knowledge
representations. This allows me to compare my work to existing work, and it also
allows me to elaborate more on the lessons learned during this project. The three
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knowledge representations are: Cyc; the Open Mind Common Sense Database and
Concept Net; and WordNet. I will compare them along the two dimensions of
knowledge representation that I described above: their function as a surrogates for
the world and their roles in facilitating inference. In particular, I will focus on the
tension that exists between the two dimensions.
2.1.1 WordNet
I will start with WordNet since that is the least similar to my knowledge represen-
tation. WordNet is a large knowledge base of words, composed primarily of nouns,
verbs, and adjectives [3]. These are organized into discrete senses. Senses relate to
each other via a small set of relations such as synonymy and hierarchical hypernymy
and hyponymy. WordNet contains over 200,000 word senses. It is quite popular be-
cause, being a simple semantic network with words as nodes and with clear and
simple relations as edges, it can be readily applied in many applications.
To many, WordNet might simply look like a large digital dictionary. While that may
not be entirely inaccurate (e.g., senses are not definitions), it is a unique knowledge
representation. I noted earlier in this thesis that an understanding of the purpose
of a knowledge representation is necessary to understand the design of the knowl-
edge representation. In this case, WordNet is optimized for lexical categorization
and word-similarity determination. This seems to dictate the design of WordNet.
Word senses facilitate this more readily than word definitions, and edges that denote
synonymy and hyponymy lend themselves handily to word-similarity determination.
As far as being a surrogate for the world, or functioning as language that can de-
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scribe the world, WordNet fulfills those roles by focusing on word sense. That is,
while the definition of a word is important, what might be even more important is
how words are used. After all, it is arguable that humans rarely explicitly learn word
definitions. More often that not, we learn which contexts are suitable for particular
words and how those words are similar to others that we already know.
The important thing to note about WordNet is that it is easy to add to it. WordNet
is rather efficient when it comes to converting elements from its target domain (i.e.,
words) to its representation. That is, for any new word that one might want to
add, one simply has to find or create a fitting sense in which to insert the word.
This may have come at some cost, however. The type of inference one can perform
with WordNet is rather limited. WordNet's senses cannot capture the relationship
between the words give and receive. This is an example where the representation's
role as a surrogate for the world overshadows its role as a facilitator for inference.
2.2 Cyc
Cyc is an artificial intelligence project that attempts to put together a comprehen-
sive knowledge base of common sense knowledge [4]. The purpose of assembling
such a knowledge base is to enable other artificial intelligence applications to per-
form human-like reasoning.
Cyc uses a specific machine-usable format to represent its knowledge. Typical inputs
to the Cyc system can be simple bits of knowledge such as "Every tree is a plant" and
"Plants die eventually". The Cyc system can also perform some very basic reason-
ing. For example, it can combine these two bits of knowledge together and answer
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questions such as, "Do trees die?". In the Cyc system, knowledge is not stored
as language, but in a specific machine-usable format. For example, simple knowl-
edge, such as "Every tree is a plant" is represented as "(#$genls #$Tree-ThePlant
#$Plant)". Experts are required to convert knowledge from natural language to
this specific Cyc format. In fact much of the effort that is currently being devoted
to Cyc development is used to enter information into the knowledge base.
The Cyc system contains roughly 50,000 concepts and 300,000 facts. On top of
these, there are millions of assertions relating concepts with concepts, concepts with
facts, and facts with facts. The Cyc system also possesses an inference machine
that can perform general logical deduction, including modus ponens, modus tol-
lens, universal quantification, and existential quantification. However, despite the
amount of knowledge they have managed to amass over the span of several decades,
a significant application for the knowledge base has yet to be designed. I suspect
that this is because the overhead of a required expert is too great.
Cyc's strategy for storing knowledge is dramatically different from WordNet's strat-
egy. Again, the best way to understand this difference is to see how it fulfills its role
as a knowledge representation. Cyc stores information and common sense about the
world, whereas WordNet stores information about words. They serve as surrogates
for very different worlds. In this respect, Cyc is much more like the typical knowl-
edge base that people imagine, i.e., it stores common sense knowledge.
What truly makes Cyc unique is that it was designed not only to store knowledge
about the world, but to store that knowledge in such away that would allow a
computer perform logical deductions over it. This by itself explains most of Cyc's
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peculiar quirks.
Much of the knowledge that Cyc aims to store can be described through natural
language. Natural language is one suitable medium in which to describe the world
and how it works. We do it all the time. We often, if not always, use language to
teach our children about how the world works.
While this is the type of knowledge that Cyc wishes to capture, Cyc is unable to
store this information as natural language. Recall that one of the primary purposes
of Cyc was to allow a computer to perform logical deductions over data about how
the world works. It is very difficult to perform logical deductions over natural lan-
guage because of the inherent ambiguity that is contained in natural language. This
is why the creator of Cyc opted to use a more machine-friendly knowledge repre-
sentation. It is able to capture much of the information contained within a natural
language utterance while allowing a computer to use it in logical deductions.
However, it is also this knowledge representation that has led to most criticisms of
Cyc. While the machine-specific format is able to capture knowledge that is con-
tained in natural language and allows machines use that knowledge, the overhead
that is required to convert a natural language expression to the Cyc format is im-
mense. This conversion is so complex that trained experts are required to do it. New
data can be entered into Cyc only as fast as Cyc's knowledge engineers can create
them. The mapping process is complex because the inherent ambiguities in natural
language must be resolved to create the unambiguous logical formations that Cyc
requires. The unfortunate consequence of this is that while Cyc has a very clean
knowledge base over which a computer can reason, it is very hard to had knowledge
17
to it. Thus, it would be difficult to apply Cyc to a particular application unless Cyc
already had within it all knowledge relevant to the domain.
This is an example in which focus on the reasoning machinery has led to a difficult-
to-use representation. While the inference over the Cyc's existing knowledge is clean
and well defined, adding to that knowledge can be a daunting task. This is evidenced
by the expertise required by Cyc knowledge engineers.
2.3 Open Mind Common Sense Database and ConceptNet
The Open Mind Common Sense Database (OMCSD) is an AI project whose goal
is to amass a large common sense knowledge base [5]. Contributions to the knowl-
edge base are made by many thousands of people from across the web. Users enter
knowledge as simple English sentences. They enter sentences such as "bottles are
often made of plastic", "some plastics may be recycled", etc.
A key difference between OMCSD and Cyc is that OMCSD stores much, if not
all, of its knowledge as the English sentences that are entered by the users. Shallow
parsers are used when processing is required. Different parsers can be used for differ-
ent purposes. For example, some who use the OMCSD data have used a particular
parser for examining analogies within the OMCSD data whereas others have used
a different parser for constructing a semantic net that represents the OMCSD data.
The exploitation of Web users as a source of knowledge avoids the problem of re-
quired expertise that Cyc runs into. Also, storing the knowledge as English sentences
themselves keeps the data in a raw and lossless format. Cyc's machine-usable for-
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mat may be easier to compute with, but it is too difficult to populate. This is a
compromise that must be considered in the design of a knowledge base.
To date, the OMCSD has amassed a large amount of knowledge. It now contains
over one million usable English assertions and roughly 600,000 assertions in other
languages. This is enough data for one to use a variety of modern machine learning
techniques.
ConceptNet is a semantic net that aims to allow a machine to reason over OMCSD's
data. The designers of ConceptNet wanted to have the ease-of-use that WordNet's
semantic network offered, but they wanted it for more complex data such as the
common sense information contained in Cyc [6].
This approach has its limitations. Whereas the Cyc engineers focused on logical
inference, the engineers of ConceptNet were more focused on reducing the overhead
required for adding knowledge to the knowledge base. They achieved their goal of
incorporating a common sense database into a knowledge base, but this does not
make it similar to Cyc. We need to look at the sorts of inference that ConceptNet
can perform. ConceptNet cannot perform logical deduction over OMCSD data as
Cyc performed over their's. The inference that this semantic net allows is based on
comparisons of similarity measures. That is, ConceptNet can compare concept A
with concept B, and concept B with concept C. After that, it can then calculate
a similarity measurement between A and C. So while ConceptNet did create easy
access to a large common sense database, it failed to capture the powerful inference
that is available in Cyc's original inference system.
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2.4 Knowledge Representation Comparison
WordNet, Cyc, and ConceptNet are quite mature as projects. Cyc was started in
1984 and OMCSD was started in 2002 (ConceptNet several years later) and has
itself spawned quite a few spin-off projects. Why then, do I propose to develop my
own knowledge base?
Cyc focuses on inference whereas ConceptNet focuses on ease-of-use representations.
A goal of my thesis is to investigate possibilities of bridging that gap and finding a
balance between the two extremes. I admire ConceptNet's designers' goal of com-
bining Cyc-like data with WordNet-like ease-of-access. They were not quite able to
do this, and I hope to be able to make some progress on this front. The sorts of
inference that ConceptNet produces are inherently fuzzy because the ambiguities
that are present in the assertions in OMCSD have not been dealt with. The reason
for this, as I have mentioned, is that mapping from ambiguous natural language to
unambiguous machine-friendly formats is quite arduous, and thus far has required
the use of trained experts. My hypothesis is that with new representations, it will
be possible to make that mapping process easier, if not automatic. A goal of this
project is also to combine WordNet's ease-of-use with data that is structured like
Cyc's data. That is, to combine WordNet's ease-of-use with unambiguous machine-
friendly data over which logical deductions could be carried out.
2.5 START's ternary expressions
The most readily accessible source of common sense knowledge is in natural lan-
guage. For example, anyone can always explain why they did something or why
something happened or why they made a certain decision. Of course, the descrip-
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tions will bottom out at some point, after which externalization in natural language
is no longer possible, but it seems a reasonable assumption that much common sense
knowledge can be expressed in natural language. This seems to be acknowledged
by both Cyc and ConceptNet: their common sense data originated with natural
language assertions.
The question now is how to work with natural language. Cyc employed an army of
experts to map natural language assertions into a clean and machine-usable format.
The required expertise formed a bottleneck in their system which limited the rate at
which they could add data into their knowledge base. ConceptNet and OMCSD, on
the other hand, hardly processed their data at all, storing it in a linguistic format.
While this dramatically reduced the overhead required to process the data, the data
was not structured enough to allow them to perform the deductive inference that
Cyc was able to.
A key problem that had to be addressed for my thesis was the processing of natural
language assertions, since much, if not all, of the knowledge that was going to be
used for sensemaking was going to be supplied as natural language. My hypothesis
is that a different representation can store clean and usable pieces of knowledge
without debilitating overhead.
I proposed to use the linguistic ternary expressions employed by Boris Katz's START
system [8]. Ternary expressions represent a natural language sentence in a format
that retains all of the linguistic information and that is optimized for fast indexing
and matching.
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For example, the sentence "Plastic bottles can be recycled.", when converted by the
START system, will produce the following set of ternary expressions:
[somebody+2338 recycle+1 bottles+2339]
[bottles+2339 has-property+1 plastic]
[somebody+2338 has-number singular]
[recycle+1 is-main Yes]
[recycle+1 has-person 3]
[recycle+ 1 has-tense present]
[recycle+1 has-modal can]
[recycle+ 1 has-voice passive]
[recycle+ 1 passive-aux be]
[bottles+2339 has-det null]
[bottles+2339 has-number plural]
Given this set of ternary expressions, the START system is able to reconstruct the
original sentence, so no information is lost. Now, what remains to be shown is that
this format is actually useful.
There are in fact three types of ternary expressions, each pertaining to a different
information type. The structural ternary expression is the most important. As its
name suggests, it contains structural information about a sentence. It contains the
relationships between objects in the sentence. In the example above, the structural
ternary expressions are [somebody+2338 recycle+1 bottles+23391 [bottles+2339
has-property+1 plastic] and express the knowledge that plastic bottles can be
recycled. Syntactic ternary expressions deal with syntactic features such things as
tense, voice, and determiners. Changes in these features can change the meaning of
a sentence, but not the fundamental semantic relationships between objects. Lexical
ternary expressions, the third type, deal with lexical properties, such as plurality.
They generally provide information about word definitions.
22
While not exactly natural language, these ternary expressions are very close to nat-
ural language. An obvious question, then, is why I insist on the use of this natural
language format when I have made it clear that it is precisely this approach that
made it so difficult for ConceptNet to perform deductive reasoning over their data.
First, natural language is an essential element of human intelligence and an essential
part of sensemaking descriptions. In fact, natural language might currently be our
best insight into the sensemaking processes of others. One of the best ways to un-
derstand why a person made a particular decision is to have them externalize their
reasons. These reasons are often externalized as natural language sentences, often
containing causal information. For example, someone may say something along the
lines of, "I decided on A, because of B." Ternary expressions are a good starting
representation because they allow me to retain that information in a form that is
more machine friendly than raw natural language. The real question is whether or
not this representation is suitable for deductive reasoning, and if it is not, whether
they can facilitate mapping onto a form that is suitable for this purpose.
3 Implementation
The work described in this thesis is on development of knowledge representations
designed specifically for sensemaking. I will describe three different versions. The
representations differ by how they balance the ability to represent knowledge versus
how well they facilitate inference.
For each representation, a different sensemaking task is used. For Systems 1 and 3, it
is prediction of attack locations and perpetrators based on maps with various intel-
ligent layers. For System 2, it is identification of facilities from aerial photographs.
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(I will clarify the tasks in the relevant sections later in the thesis.)
Each different system reflects changes in domain and/or shifts in knowledge rep-
resentation design, and I will discuss these details in the sections devoted to each
system. The focus for System 1 is its inference module. If any compromises had to
be made between inference and another part of the system, then inference always
came out on top. Systems 2 and 3 take the opposite approach. In those two systems,
I tried to ensure that it is easy to use them to represent knowledge.
3.1 System 1
The focus of System 1 is to perform the type of sensemaking I described above.
This means that it must be bidirectional. It must draw from previous knowledge to
place inputs into context. It should also be "fuzzy". By fuzzy, I mean that instead
of deciding on one particular hypothesis and rejecting all others, the system should
provide all of them, but rank them by likelihood. The decisions human beings make
are rarely black and white, and most of the time we choose one option because it
seems better than the rest, not because it is necessarily correct. I want System 1 to
emulate this.
The domain for this system is counterinsurgency (COIN) decision making. The task
is to predict whether one group will attack another given some specific information.
For example, it might be known that Group A and Group B are enemies. It might
also be known that Group A possesses the weapons that would be required to attack
Group B, and that Group A could attack Group B and expect minimal repercus-
sions. Such inputs might strongly suggest that Group A will attack Group B. Thus,
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if the system was made aware that someone did attack Group B and it was the
system's task to identify the attacker, then given this evidence and no overriding
evidence, it should say that Group A did it.
3.2 System 1 Machinery
Fuzziness is introduced to the representation through the notion of likelihoods. That
is, hypotheses are not simply right or wrong, but rather, they are either more or
less likely. This allows for non-rigid inference as well as accommodation of uncertain
(e.g., occluded) inputs and knowledge.
This system is built around the use of frames. The representation is a (simplified)
model of the world. It is composed of frames, and each frame represents an object.
In the case of the COIN task, a very common object is a terrorist group. Thus within
this world, groups are represented by group frames. Group frames have slots which
correspond to properties of groups. For example, there is a name slot, a location
slot, a preferred-method-of-attack slot, etc. Events in this world are modeled
as objects as well. The only general difference between events and objects is that
events have a time slot associated with them. For example, an attack event will
be stored as an attack frame, just as the group object is stored as a group frame,
except that the attack frame must have a time slot, because it is an event.
These frames, which represent object types, must be entered by hand. This is a
manifestation of the tension between ease-of-use and inference. I made this compar-
ison between Cyc and ConceptNet. Cyc opts for more useful data and consequently
struggles to import common sense into the knowledge base. ConceptNet, on the
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other hand, opts for the crowdsourced data from OCSMD and is able to apply a
semantic net over it, but that limits ConceptNet to weaker inference. For System 1,
the balance shifts in the direction of inference. The goal is to build something that
can perform interesting and realistic inference. This comes at the cost of making
data entry an arduous process. This system is more Cyc-like than ConceptNet like.
Much of the knowledge for this implementation is added by a "knowledge engineer"
(KE). It is the presence of this knowledge engineer that suggests the comparison to
Cyc. The job of the KE is to provide the system with knowledge about the world
and how it works; that is, knowledge about objects, such as groups, and events,
such as attacks. The KE tells the system that in the world, there exists an object
type which is known as a group, and that groups have certain properties, such as
names, locations, and preferred methods of attack. The KE tells the system that
there is an event type known as an attack, and that attacks have various properties
associated with them. All of this is done through a pseudo-language that is not as
ambiguous as natural language but is still more readable than Python, which is the
language that System 1 is written in.
Now that the system has information about objects and events such as groups and
attacks, it is possible to instantiate them. Instantiation is done via natural lan-
guage. START processes natural language assertions which ultimately create new
instances of objects or modify already existing objects. This can be done by the KE
or any end user of the system. For example, a KE might instantiate and describe
groups that he already knows exists. An end user may do the same as well, or
they may wish to add in information about recent events. For example, they might
create a new attack object in response to reports of an IED, or they might rename
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a group that was reported to have assumed new leadership. A common scenario
is that there will be many instantiated objects in the world. More often than not,
some of the properties of these objects are known while others remain unknown.
For example, the date and location of an attack might be known, but the identity
of the perpetrator might not be known.
Given a world with partially instantiated objects, it is possible to calculate the like-
lihood of such a world, through the application of a set of rules. Rules take into
account properties of instantiated objects, and use the values of those properties
to return a number. This number is incorporated into a running score that indi-
cates the likelihood of the world. For example, suppose that an attack event has
a perpetrator slot and a victim slot. A simple rule will be one that takes as input
the values of these slots and returns a high number if they are different and a low
number if they are the same. What this rule says is that groups tend to not attack
themselves. Of course, sometimes groups can attack themselves; mutiny and coups
come to mind. Additional rules can be written to accommodate these special cir-
cumstances. There are many rules, and their outputs are aggregated into the world
score. Worlds with higher scores are more likely while worlds with lower scores are
less likely.
These rules are also entered by the KE. They are so complex that, currently, they
are entered directly into the code as Python. Future efforts will be devoted to de-
veloping a friendlier way for defining rules. The numbers that each rule returns
is determined by the KE. This is the part of the system that plays heavily in the
bottom-up part of sensemaking. The KE can create rules that accurately assign
values to object properties. Similarly, they can write rules that undervalue or over-
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value certain inputs, and such rules can model human biases.
3.3 System 1 Sensemaking
Suppose that the KE creates a world with knowledge about various groups A, B,
C, and D. Suppose then that a user boots up a system and creates an attack in
which group D is the victim. He then asks the system to help him figure out who
the attacker is. His query is, "Who attacked D?". The system sends this to START
and returns with some information that notifies the system that the user is inter-
ested in the attack object and that the user wants to figure out who belongs in the
perpetrator slot.
At this point, the system splits the world into four distinct clones, one for each
group. In each world, one of the possible groups is set as the perpetrator. When
the system compares these four hypothesis worlds, it essentially ask, "Is a world in
which A attacked D more probable than a world in which B, C, or D attacked D?"
The job of the system now is to collect information until it can decide which world
is most likely, and determine from that which group is the most likely perpetrator.
There are many strategies that the system can use. For example, the score for a
world might pass some predetermined threshold. A time limit might have been im-
posed, and the system be required to make a best guess. There might be no more
information available, so the system simply has to provide its current best hypoth-
esis.
Whereas application of rules represents the bottom-up portion of sensemaking, the
top-down portion is represented by information collection. Using the current hy-
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potheses (in this case, worlds A, B, C, and D), the system will guide the top-down
process of information foraging. Its job is to ask for more information. This in-
formation might be the location of a group, the time of an attack, or any other
unknown property. Since the system is not allowed to ask for all information in a
single step (to force foveated attention), it is forced to search for information.
There are many strategies when it comes to information gathering. The simplest
strategy is to pick slots at random. The next simplest is to select slots that will
satisfy the largest number of rules. Rules only add to a world score if they fire, and
they only fire if all of the necessary information is available. Infrastructure has been
implemented that tells the system which slots are needed to fire certain rules.
The cognitively plausible foraging strategies are what particularly interest me, how-
ever. These are strategies of slot selection that I imagine myself employing when I
attempt to solve these sorts of COIN problems. All of these strategies involve, in
one form or another, a calculation of expected information gain. In order for the
system to be able to calculate expected information gain, it must be able to predict
the information that will be provided. This is why the KE, when he creates a slot
(i.e., object property), must also provide the system with some information as to
what values might go there. In this example, the system knows that there are four
groups, so it knows that a perpetrator slot in an attack object can take four possible
values: A, B, C, or D. (Incidentally, it is also due to this knowledge that the system
is able to create the four hypothesis worlds, one for each group.)
Once the system is able to calculate expected information gain, there are some
additional foraging strategies that it can apply. The first one implemented was a
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maximum variance strategy, in which the system selects those slots which maximize
variance among the scores of the world. This quickly leads to worlds with very high
and very low scores.
It is also possible to implement biased strategies. For example, confirmation bias
occurs when one seeks out information that only supports the current hypothesis.
To model this bias, the system searches for information that supports the current
best hypothesis and disregards all other inputs, regardless of whether other infor-
mation might actually be more useful.
Designing such strategies is a very direct way of modeling biases. It is possible to
model them in more indirect ways. For example, various limits could be imposed on
the inference mechanisms, such as memory limits. Such restrictions could give rise
to various other types of biases. In fact, the input limit is a form of such restrictions.
A number of foraging strategies have been implemented in response to the system's
foveated attention, and some of these do exhibit some well known biases such as
confirmation bias and anchoring bias.
3.4 System 1 Discussion
There are dramatic differences between this system and the other two which are
described later in the thesis. Because this system focuses on inference, it is more
powerful. It has not been thoroughly tested, but already we can see that it can
emulate some of the cognitive strategies that people might use when performing the
COIN task. Compared to the simple if/then rules and boolean expression evaluation
that are available to Systems 2 and 3, this one is far more advanced.
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However, it is substantially harder to add information to the knowledge base. For
much of the information, the process is as simple as writing down natural language
common sense assertions. START is able to convert a rather broad spectrum of nat-
ural language sentences into a format that is usable. However, in order to add some
probabilistic capabilities to the system, the notion of a rule is introduced. These
rules, when expressed in natural language, are so convoluted and confusing that
they are programmed in directly. This is what gives rise to the role of a knowledge
engineer. This representation is complex enough that it is unrealistic to expect that
anyone can simply sit down and enter information into the knowledge base. Just
as had been the case with Cyc, inclusion of a more complex and robust inference
component forces me to make compromises, and the representation's role as a sur-
rogate had been hampered. While it can represent as much as Systems 2 and 3, and
perhaps even more, because it can represent probabilities and tendencies while the
others cannot, much more work and expertise is required to enter knowledge into
the system.
3.5 System 2
The task for this second system is facility identification from aerial photographs.
These facilities are generally large facilities such as hospitals, chemical plants, power
plants, nuclear weapon facilities, etc. The inputs are aerial photographs that are
similar to those that can be found on Google Maps' satellite view. There are de-
tails such as markings on rooftops (e.g., the large distinctive H of a helicopter pad),
building orientation, roads, landmarks, etc. Additional information such as levels
of human activity at certain times of the day are available as well. These might
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include general temperature of the buildings, cell phone activity, or readings from
various chemical sensors.
One question that is immediately raised is, why is a knowledge base even necessary
for this task? Machine learning algorithms already exist for tasks like this. What's
more, they are actually quite good. Although it is true that this is a very visual
task, and that some machinery out there exists already to solve such problems, none
have attempted to do it in a human-like way. There are many tasks at which com-
puters are much better than humans. However, the point of this project is not to
solve problems better or more efficiently. The point of the project is to solve the
sensemaking task in a human-like way so that we might better understand what
human intelligence is. State-of-the-art systems will solve the facility identification
problem, but they will also probably shed very little light on the human processes
that allow us to solve the same problems. They are black boxes and are not useful
for the purpose of this project.
That said, there are some visual tasks that simply cannot be performed without
vision. For example, it is impossible for someone to explain to someone what it
is like to see red. It is possible to explain about the nature of light, and how at
particular frequencies, light appears red to the human eye. And yet, that really is
not the same as simply pointing out examples of red to a person and letting them
construct their own definition of the color red.
Is the identification of facilities from photographs any different? How can I claim
that this is not solely a visual task? I must justify my plan to solve it using lan-
guage. To answer this question, I propose a simple thought exercise. Imagine that
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you are given an aerial photograph. However, your task is not to identify the facility
displayed in the photograph. Your task is to describe the photograph to someone
who is not present, e.g., over the phone, of what you see in the photograph. It is
this other person's task to determine the contents of the photograph. This does not
seem too unreasonable. After all, one can always explain why a particular facility
is identified as a hospital. Perhaps it is because of the overhang over the emergency
room entrance, the iconic helipad, are the ambulance parked onsite. Perhaps it is a
combination of those. No one will look at an aerial photograph and claim that they
simply know that it is a photograph of a hospital and that there is no explanation.
Facility identification is a higher level task, and some knowledge that is useful for
completing this task can be externalized as natural language sentences. This is the
sort of knowledge that will be processed and stored within the knowledge base.
Figure 1 shows an aerial photograph of a coal power plant in Wales. Cooling towers
are visible, which are a telltale sign of large industrial complexes. In fact, many of
the towers themselves are not visible, but the characteristic plume of steam that
comes out from them is visible. Stockpiles of coal can be seen. The facility is near
water, possibly for cleansing and cooling purposes. Roads where heavy cargo can be
transported in and out can be seen. Perhaps we can find some transformers. There
are in fact, many of them! These happen to be the types of descriptions needed to
classify this facility as a coal power plant. These should be enough to identify the
facility as a coal power plant, regardless of the fact that there some noise is present
(e.g., the presence of green grass and parked cars).
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Figure 1: Aberthaw power station in Wales
3.5.1 System 2 Machinery
This system uses START to parse common sense assertions. These assertions gen-
erally contain causal knowledge. For example, there might be a rule such as "All
industrial facilities must be cooled." The system could combine this with another
rule, "Coal power stations are industrial facilities." to conclude that coal power
stations must be cooled. It could then look for a rule such as, "If a facility has a
cooling tower then the facility is cooled." Thus, if a cooling tower is in fact found,
then the system could and should conclude that the facility is cooled, and thus might
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be some sort of industrial facility. This might narrow the possible choices down and
help the system decide what additional information to look for.
These assertions are asserted as natural language sentences. The system uses the
START system to parse them into the more usable ternary expression format. This
format, while more usable and portable, does not discard any information because
the original sentence can be recovered from it in its entirety.
An example of this process will be useful. "If a facility has a cooling tower then
the facility is cooled." is an example of a very common type of assertion for this
knowledge base. "If A then B" is a typical causal knowledge format. Passed to
START, this will return:
[cool+1 if+1 have+2]
[somebody cool+1 facility+19]
[facility+19 have+2 coolingtower+20]
[cooling-tower+20 related-to+2 facility+19]
[cool+1 has-person 3]
[cool+1 has-tense present]
[cool+1 has-voice passive]
[cool+1 passive-aux be]
[if+1 is-clausal Yes]
[if+1 is-main Yes]
[have+2 has-person 3]
[have+2 has-tense present]
[have+2 has-position leading]
[somebody has-number singular]
[somebody is-proper Yes]
[facility+19 has-det indefinite]
[facility+19 has-number singular]
[cooling-tower+20 has-det indefinite]
[cooling-tower+20 has-number singular]
I am interested in structure, which contains the semantic content relevant to the
task. Non-structural ternary expressions are largely ignored.
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The structural ternary expressions are:
[cool+1 if+1 have+2]
[somebody cool+1 facility+19]
[facility+19 have+2 coolingtower+20]
[cooling.tower+20 related-to+2 facility+19]
The system will break this up into the antecedent and consequence. The antecedent
is:
[facility+19 have+2 coolingtower+20]
The consequence is:
[somebody cool+1 facility+19]
The other two ternary expressions are for now ignored by the system. The first:
[cool+1 if+1 have+2]
is ignored because that is simply the if/then ternary expression. The other:
[coolingtower+20 related-to+2 facility+19]
is a possessive ternary expression, and not one which the system require for reason-
ing.
The antecedent and consequence are stored two different hashes. The first hash uses
the antecedent as key and the consequent as value. The second hash does things
in reverse, storing the consequent as the key and the antecedent as the value. This
allows for faster lookup. If the system learns that there are cooling towers then
it will suspect that the facility is cooled. If it looks for evidence to support the
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hypothesis that the current building is a facility that requires cooling, then it will
know to look for cooling towers. The presence of cooling towers can function as
both an antecedent and consequence.
This brings me to a key feature of the sensemaking system: bidirectional reason-
ing. An aspect of human reasoning that I have attempted to model is bottom-up
and top-down reasoning. In the case of this system, I wish to find data to support
current hypotheses and to generate hypotheses given some input data. That is why
both the antecedent and consequent need to be keyed for fast lookup. Depending
on where we are within the sensemaking process, the system will either start with
the consequence and look for the antecedent or start with the antecedent and look
for the consequence.
I covered one type of rule: the if/then rule. Another type of rule used is the require
rule. In structure, it is very similar to the if/then rule in structure. For example,
"That one burns coal requires that one has coal". Similar to the if/then rule, it has
two parts. The difference is that whereas multiple if/then rules could be combined
to form ORs, multiple require statements could be combined to form ANDs. For
example, if there is within the knowledge base the assertions "If A then C" and "If
B then C", then that implies "If (A or B) then C". Now suppose there is in the
knowledge base the assertions "C requires A" and "C requires B". This is implies "C
requires (A and B)". Combinations of if/then statements and require statements
can yield arbitrarily complex boolean expressions within the knowledge base. I will
touch on the implications of this in a later section.
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3.5.2 System 2 Knowledge
As previously noted, the domain for this particular system is the task of facility
identification from aerial photographs. I developed a small knowledge base of infor-
mation pertaining to facilities. Here are some sample rules that are in the knowledge
base:
If XX turns a turbine, XX produces power.
If there is steam, then XX can turn a turbine.
If there is hot water, then there is steam.
If there is heat, then XX can produce hot water.
If XX produces hot water, then there is hot water.
If XX burns YY, then XX produces heat.
If XX produces heat, then there is heat.
If XX produces power, then there is power.
If there are transformers, then XX can store energy.
If a power plant has a cooling tower, then the power plant is cooled.
If there is a cooling tower, then the facility has a cooling tower.
If there is much visible steam, there is usually a cooling tower.
If there is coal, then coal can be burned.
Coal is mined from coal pits.
Coal is unloaded from trains.
Coal is unloaded from dump trucks.
If there are large roads, then there are dump trucks.
If there are tracks, then there are trains.
Coal pits are black.
Coal power stations are facilities that burn coal to produce power.
Coal power stations are facilities that must be cooled.
Coal power stations are facilities that must store energy.
Coal power stations are facilities that sometimes have coal pits.
Coal power stations are facilities that sometimes have tracks.
Coal power stations are facilities that sometimes have roads.
If there is a nuclear reactor, then there is nuclear energy.
If there is nuclear energy, then XX can use nuclear energy.
Natural draft cooling towers can be up to 400 meters tall.
Counterflow cooling towers can be up to 40 meters tall and up to 175
meters long.
Hyperboloid cooling towers be up to 200 meters tall and 140 meters
wide.
Natural gas power stations are facilities that burn natural gas to produce
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power.
If there are oil wells, there might be natural gas.
If there are gas wells, there is natural gas.
If there is natural gas, then natural gas can be burned.
Natural gas power stations must be cooled.
That there are natural gas pumps requires that there are pipes.
Geothermal plants extract steam from underground to produce power.
Thermal solar plants use solar energy to produce power.
If there are many mirrors, then sunlight can be focused on a tower.
Thermal solar plant towers use sunlight to produce heat.
Thermal solar plants have turbines.
Biomass-fueled power stations are facilities that burn biomass to pro-
duce power.
Waste from sugar plants, municipal solid waste, and methane are types
of biomass.
Biomass-fueled power stations must be cooled.
Nuclear power plants are facilities that use nuclear energy to produce
power.
Nuclear power plants convert the energy released by nuclear fission re-
actions into heat.
Nuclear power plants must be cooled.
A wind farm is a group of wind turbines located near each other.
Wind turns wind turbines.
Hydroelectric power plants use the force of flowing to turn water tur-
bines.
Solar power plants use photovoltaic cells to convert sunlight into direct
current.
Direct current is power.
Petroleum refineries must be located far from residential areas.
Petroleum refineries required waste disposal facilities.
Petroleum refineries need to have an abundant source of water.
Petroleum refineries can transport using barges, trains, or pipelines.
Petroleum refineries must be cooled.
Airports are facilities that always have runways.
Airports are facilities that usually have planes.
Air force bases look like airports.
Air force bases are facilities that have security checkpoints on roads lead-
ing into the air force base.
Air force bases are facilities that often have military aircraft.
Air force bases are often located far away from cities.
Air force bases are facilities that sometimes have houses for personnel.
Harbors never have runways.
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Navy -bases are like harbors.
Navy bases are facilities that sometimes have runways.
Navy bases are facilities that sometimes have military ships.
Navy bases are facilities that never have water slides.
As the reader will see, it is simply a list of if/then and require sentences. There
are some other sentence types that add additional information, such as "Coal pits
are black.". The "XX" and "YY" are wildcards that help with binding between
antecedents and consequences. For example, "If XX burns YY, then XX produces
heat" uses XX to specify that the very same XX that burns YY is also the same
XX that produces heat. So, if "coal factory" was bound to the first XX, then it is
also bound to the second XX. Now, "coal factory produces heat" can be used as the
antecedent in the next round of matching.
3.5.3 System 2 Discussion
It is clear that the inference capabilities of this system pale in comparison to those
of System 1. The entire knowledge base was compressed into hypothesis facility
types which corresponded to boolean expressions that stored inputs in various com-
binations. For example, a coal power plant is equivalent to a boolean expression
such as (cooling tower AND (coal pit OR coal trains)...) and inference is simply the
comparison of the list of inputs with these boolean expressions to see which are sat-
isfied. If an expression is satisfied then the facility type is immediately determined.
If no boolean expressions evaluated as true, the facility is classified as unknown.
This system focuses on developing an infrastructure that would make it easy to
convert natural language to a machine-usable format. Because of this, there is are
compromises with regard to the inference capabilities. It is still possible to add
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additional inference capabilities to what is already here; however, to do so, I will
encounter obstacles that were created when I decided to focus on ease of language
conversion.
This system did at least manage to perform some semblance of bidirectional rea-
soning. It is very likely that a sparse list of inputs will generate a list of multiple
hypotheses. Given this list of hypotheses, it is possible to "look" for certain types
of inputs. For example, if the presence of a cooling tower was enough to definitively
decide that the facility was a nuclear power plant (i.e., no other hypothesis facilities
contained cooling towers), then the system will search for that.
The biggest problem for this system is the required post-processing of START's
output. Even though the ternary expressions are much easier to work with com-
pared to raw natural language, they are still variable enough to require substantial
amounts of coding to be able to handle different types of sentences. That is why
only four types are used: if/then, require, properties, and definitions. This means
that I have not yet accomplished the task for this system, which is development
of an easy-to-populate knowledge representation. Yes, the mapping from natural
language to a machine usable format was made automatic, but it must accept more
than four sentence types. I essentially have the ease-of-use of WordNet (though even
that is debatable), but I do not have the common sense data to which Cyc has access.
Two different hashes are set up for if/then rules and two different hashes for require
statements. Reasoning is different for the two kinds of statements because ORs and
ANDs affect reasoning in subtle ways. ORs only require one antecedent and ANDs
require all. Nesting sometimes means that more than one antecedent is required,
41
but not all. As for properties, different data structures are required to store those.
The same thing is true for definitions. For each type of sentence (e.g., if/then versus
require), new data storage methods are required and it is not uncommon for the
inference infrastructure to require a significant change to the code (e.g., addition of
a new data structure to accommodate the new knowledge type).
Additional work in scaling must be done before this system can become useful. The
purpose of this particular system is to allow for easier conversion of natural lan-
guage assertions the representation's format. To realize that purpose, it must first
be able to handle more types of sentences. There are two ways that this might
be accomplished. First, it might be that the number of sentence types that are
required to describe the sensemaking process is rather small, and thus it might be
possible to manually write code to handle each separate case. The other option is
to automatically handle new types of sentences. This would be ideal, but it might
be much more difficult.
The inference system must be augmented as well. There is some semblance of bidi-
rectional reasoning, but since each facility type can be associated with a single long
boolean expression, the knowledge that is stored ends up being rather flat. Ei-
ther the current representation must be changed, or another representation must be
added on top of the current one to enable deeper and more interesting inference.
The bottom line is that there is much work that can still be done. However, an
important lesson was learned during the design and implementation of this system,
and that is that making data input easier can make inference more difficult.
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3.6 System 3
System 3 is quite similar to System 2. The domain however, is that of the first
system. It is the COIN decision-making task.
Even though the domain has changed, many of the ideas behind the knowledge base
remain the same: the knowledge is largely causal, though the actors are different.
For example, "If Group A and Group B are allies and Group C attacks Group B,
then Group A will attack Group C." is an example of knowledge that would be
relevant to this domain. I will provide a list of examples in a later section.
3.7 System 3 Machinery
Whereas System 2 I merely uses START to parse the English assertions for the
knowledge base and did most of storage and reasoning on my own, System 3 of-
floads much of this to the START servers. START already has an implementation
of a knowledge base as well as a matcher for retrieving knowledge, and all I had to
do was to repurpose it.
Initially, assertions are dealt with in very much the same way as in System 2. They
are entered as natural English sentences, so START must parse them. However,
instead of processing the ternary expressions that START returns, almost nothing
is done. Instead, START automatically stores everything inside its own knowledge
base. START's knowledge base has its own machinery that is used to store, orga-
nize, and access knowledge. The important thing that I must describe here is how
I communicate with it, and in particular, how I retrieve information from it.
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System 3 uses START's matcher to find information within START's knowledge
base. Given a set of ternary expressions, START's matcher will find and return
any assertions in the knowledge base which contain those ternary expressions. It
performs a simple AND. A set of ternary expressions might be T1, T2, T3,...,TN.
Any assertion in the knowledge base which contains these n ternary expressions will
be returned.
Here is an example. Suppose there are the following assertions in START's knowl-
edge base:
1. If XX is enemies with YY, then XX attacks YY.
2. If YY attacks XX, then XX attacks YY.
3. If XX attacks YY, then XX is enemies with YY.
4. If XX is allies with YY, then XX does not attack YY.
5. If XX has tanks, then XX can attack heavy targets.
The system can retrieve these by using START's matcher. The input to START's
matcher is a list of ternary expressions. Any assertion which contains at least this
list of input ternary expressions is returned. For example, suppose the system sent
[XX attack YYI to START's matcher. Several of the assertions in START's knowl-
edge base will be matched, and thus returned. More specifically, assertions 1, 2, 3,
and 4 above will be returned, but 5 will not be returned because [XX attack YYI
never appears there. It is interesting to note that 4 does appear there, even though
the truth value does not match. That is, I want to match on assertions for which XX
attacks YY, but I seem to have also gotten assertions in which XX does not attack
YY. This is a consequence of how ternary expressions and the START system are
designed; truth value is considered to be a syntactic feature rather than a structural
element. To indicate this fact, a ternary expression of the form [verb isnegative
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yes] flags a statement as being negative. The system filters these types of ternary
expressions out to ensure that it gets only statements whose truth values are true.
In this example, the key ternary expression would be [attack is-negative yes].
Given these matching capabilities, it is possible to chain knowledge without imple-
menting an independent data structure as I did before. Once again, the rules are
similar to those in the second system, though the domain is a bit different. They
are for the most part causal and are quite similar to the list above, e.g., "If XX is
enemies with YY, then XX attacks YY." So given an antecedent or a consequent, it
is quite simple to find the corresponding half of a rule. For example, if the knowl-
edge base contains a rule, "If A then B", then the system can send relation "A" to
START's matcher to find rules in which "A" appears.
It is possible to specify which side of the rule an expression appears on. In other
words, the system can use the matcher with the express goal of finding consequences
that follow from "A" or, in a different query, the antecedents from which "A" fol-
lows. Let me walk through an example. Consider the causal rule, "If XX is enemies
with YY, then XX attacks YY". Among the ternary expressions that represent this
sentence, there is a crucial one that flags it as a if/then sentence about causal knowl-
edge. It is the "if" ternary expression. In this case, it is "[attack if be]". The "be"
refers to XX being enemies with YY, and the "attack" refers to XX attacking YY.
So, given "A", the system can find sentences in which A is the antecedent by looking
for a ternary expression: [A if any-relation]. Similarly, if the system wishes to
find sentences in which "A" is the consequence, then it would try something such as
[any-relation if A]. "Any-relation" is a special wildcard keyword that START's
matcher uses.
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As in the first system, there are two types of causal rules: if/then and require rules.
If/then statements represent ORs and require statements represent ANDs.
3.8 System 3 Knowledge
For completeness, a sample of the rules used for the second system are provided.
These are rules are meant to describe usual if/then relations, i.e., if A then maybe
B.
If group-b is group-a's enemy, then group-a wants to attack group-b.
If group-a has attacked group-b, then group-a wants to attack group-b.
If group-b has attacked group-a, then group-a wants to attack group-b.
If group-b has something that group-a wants, then group-a wants to at-
tack group-b.
If group-b encroaches on group-a's territory, then group-a wants to at-
tack group-b.
If group-a is at war with group-b, then group-a wants to attack group-b.
If group-a wants to attack group-b, group-b might want to attack group-
a.
If group-a wants to kill someone from group-b, then group-a wants to
attack group-b.
group-a and group-b are allies.
if group-a is allied with group-b, then group-b is allied with group-a.
If group-a gives group-b equipment, then group-a is allied with group-b.
If group-a gives group-b land, then group-a is allied with group-b.
If group-a supports group-b, then group-a might be allied with group-b.
If group-a wants to attack group-c, then group-b wants to attack group-
c.
If group-c wants to attack group-a, then group-c might want to attack
group-b.
If group-a is allied with group-b, then group-a does not want to attack
group-b.
If group-a is allied with group-b, then group-b does not want to attack
group-a.
If group-b is aware that group-a will attack, group-a might not want to
attack group-b.
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If group-b is near civilians, group-a does not want to attack group-b with
heavy-weapon.
Guns are equipment.
Munitions are equipment.
Personnel is equipment.
Vehicles are equipment.
If group-a has heavy-target and group-b can use heavy-weapon, then
group-b can attack group-b.
If group-a has medium-target and group-b can use -medium-weapon or
heavy-weapon, then group-b can attack group-a.
If group-a has light-target-a and group-b can use weapon-a, then group-
b can attack group-a.
If group wants to destroy buildings, group must use explosives.
That group uses explosives requires that group have explosives.
Fortified buildings are heavy-target.
Armored vehicles are heavy-target.
Guarded facilities are heavy-target.
Unarmored vehicles are medium-target.
Unguarded facilities are medium-target.
Armed personnel are medium-target.
Unarmed personnel are light-target.
Tanks are heavy-weapon.
Mortars are heavy-weapon.
Rocket launchers are heavy-weapon.
Rocket launchers are explosives.
Guns are medium-weapon.
Grenades are medium-weapons.
IEDs are medium-weapon.
IEDs are explosives.
VBIEDs are medium-weapon.
VBIEDs are explosives.
Knives are weapon.
That group can use tanks requires that group have tanks.
That group can use tanks requires that there are load-bearing roads.
That group can use tanks requires that there be room for tanks.
If group has Y amount of resources, then group can afford tanks.
If group can afford tanks, then group has tanks.
If group-a gives Z to group-b, then group-b has Z.
That group has tanks requires that group can store tanks.
That group has tanks requires that group has people who can drive
tanks.
If group has Z amount of resources, then Group can afford small arms.
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That group can use small arms requires that group have people who can
use small arms.
Small arms can be used on small roads.
Small arms can be used on large roads.
If group-a knows that group-b attacked, group-a will retaliate.
If group-a is allied with group-b, and group-c attacked group-a, then
group-b will attack group-a.
group-a has usually attacked group-b when group-a was able to attack
group-b.
group has preferred to use heavy-weapon.
group-b now has heavy-weapon.
3.8.1 System 3 Discussion
The behavior of System 3 is very similar compared to those of System 2. The same
type of knowledge was used, just in a different format. The representation is very
similar, and the goals definitely are. The difference between Systems 2 and 3 is
some back-end infrastructure. The system still only accepts the four original sen-
tence types.
Decisions were made to ensure that data entry would be simple and easy, and this
led to a knowledge representation that was difficult to perform inference over. To
improve inference, I will have to modify the representation, build a newer one on
top of it, or build a more robust inference system.
Again, there are two types of causal rules, which represent OR and AND state-
ments. These can be combined to create arbitrary boolean expressions that repre-
sent whether or not conditions are met for events of interest, such as XX's attacking
YY. This representation is very flat, and the sort of bidirectional reasoning that
occurs over it is not very interesting.
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The key difference between Systems 2 and 3 is expandability. While the capabilities
of the two systems are very similar, System 2 is too rigid. That is, for every type of
knowledge, data structures and special methods are required. However, once storage
and matching was moved to START's own knowledge base, things are much cleaner
and more organized. Everything was stored as a set of ternary expressions, and the
START matcher can be used for many types of chaining and reasoning. Therefore,
even though the capabilities are roughly equivalent, the System 3 has the potential
to be more scaleable. However, the problem of converting natural language to usable
data still remains a serious obstacle.
4 Discussion of Systems 2 and 3
The performances of these two systems was a bit disappointing. An important goal
is to emulate human-like bidirectional reasoning. While I have describe how the
system did perform what might be considered bidirectional reasoning, it was not
very sophisticated. Several factors contributed to this.
The most important reason is that too much emphasis was put on simplifying data
entry. There is a tension between a versatile knowledge representation (i.e., a rep-
resentation that can represent many things) and a representation which is suitable
for powerful inference. In the case of these two implementations, the focus is on
versatility, and sadly, the ability to reason took a back seat, and it shows.
Some design decisions contributed to poor performance as well. The "knowledge"
stored in the knowledge bases is too sparse; I designed individual trains of thought
that might start from a series of sparse inputs and conclude with the decision that
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a particular image represented a coal power plant. In other words, I asked my-
self, how many ways might one come to the conclusion that this facility is a power
plant? I wrote those down and implemented them. The problem is that there is
a vast number of ways to conclude that the facility is a power plant, and I failed
to capture many of them. What ends up happening is that the system can only
correctly identify a facility if I had given it an exact example of how to identify
that facility. Any deviation resulted in the system's failure to produce a meaningful
result.
It is difficult to construct a body of knowledge for a knowledge base that is in-
teresting. Given some inputs and an expected output, it is simple to imagine the
knowledge that a reasoning system would have to draw upon to connect the two.
However, to make a knowledge base more realistic, additional knowledge must be
added to serve as noise. This should not be just any sort of noise however. Given
a particular task, some knowledge in the knowledge base might be noise. However,
given a different task, that very same knowledge might be a critical link in a chain of
reasoning. Therein lies the difficulty. It is easy to connect A to B in the knowledge
base. It is also easy to add noise to hide the connection between A and B. However,
it is difficult to avoid adding noise simply for the sake of adding noise. That is, I
wish to add in some knowledge that makes it difficult to connect A and B, but I
also what that knowledge to be an essential link in the connection between C and
D. This is what our knowledge is like. Knowing that a fire is hot might not be the
most relevant information when I try to find a pen, but it is definitely useful in other
situations.
In Systems 2 and 3, as focus shifted away from inference and more toward knowl-
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edge entry efficiency, the inference capabilities deteriorated. That is not to say that
inference and easy knowledge entry are mutually exclusive. However, it seems to
often be the case that decisions that favor one will be detrimental to the other. I
have already covered this to some degree. Recall that in both implementations, all
hypotheses were equivalent to a boolean expression, and the system only had to
check for certain inputs. For example, to determine whether or not a coal power
plant was present, the system had to check for the presence of coal AND cooling
towers AND water AND steam AND NOT hyperbolic cooling towers AND etc. If
the boolean expression was satisfied, then there was a coal power plant. If the
boolean expression was not satisfied, there was no coal power plant. There is no
grey area.
These likelihood measures can be reincorporated into the models. For example, a
rule "If A, then B" might be rewritten as "If A, then B with likelihood p". Or, I
might return to the representation of System 1 and a frames representation. How-
ever, data entry into System 1 is so complex that a knowledge engineer is required,
which goes against the goal of System 1 and 2 to make data entry easier. Once
again, I find myself either favoring easy data entry or complex inference, and it
seems hard to strike a balance between the two. There are still many things that
can be tried to bridge the gap and develop a knowledge representation that is both
easy to use and useful for inference.
5 Discussion
There were two major goals in this project. The first was to design a knowledge
representation that would facilitate sensemaking, a human inference process. The
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other goal was to tackle the language-to-machine mapping problem that all knowl-
edge base designers struggle with. What I discovered was that these goals often
conflicted with each other. The focus in Systems 2 and 3 is to leverage START's
language processing capabilities in order to automate and reduce the overhead of
the knowledge generate process. That, to some degree, was successful. Yet decisions
that were made in order to make information processing easier severely crippled any
sensemaking capabilities the system might have possessed.
System 1 on the other hand, focused on a more interesting inference engine to the
system. The drawback this time was that it is no longer sufficient to simply supply
the system with knowledge via natural language and START. The role of the knowl-
edge engineer is created as a result. Furthermore, in the case of rules, the knowledge
is so complex the knowledge engineer is required to program them in himself! No
pseudo language is yet available.
Of course, these are broad generalizations. There are many other factors that led to
these results, and many of them can be addressed. Even though inference over the
START ternary expressions is difficult, it might be the case that further research will
show that ternary expressions are in fact quite suitable for logical inference, which
is something I have suspected from the beginning. Similarly, it might be possible
to remove the need for a knowledge engineer from System 1. Perhaps it would be
possible to devise an easy-to-write representation for rules. The same, of course,
can be said for Cyc and ConceptNet. In fact, the engineers of both projects are
constantly improving their representations to bridge this gap between easy-to-use
implementations and powerful inference.
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The lesson, after all this, is that in designing a knowledge representation, one will
often find oneself at one of two extremes. It is either easy to store knowledge in that
representation, or it is easy to perform complex inference with that representation.
The task then is to move away from these extremes, by augmenting and building
upon these representations, until we strike a productive balance between the two.
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